I wrote about the ROCA vulnerability yesterday. It affects Infineon security chips used in TPMs and smart cards. While it is easy to identify TPM modules and computers using them, smart cards are more difficult.
Looking back, we can find many examples of errors in the algorithms used to create encryption keys. Not very many of them, however, were found in chips designed and sold as high-security devices for email signing, verifying software integrity, VPN access, or citizen e-ID cards.
We have had a busy Summer so far. We introduced a new service for SSL certificate monitoring (keychest.net), presented at Black Hat USA, and gave a talk at DEFCON. The latest news was recognition of our cryptographic platform by reviewers of the ACM CCS conference. Continue reading Enigma Bridge encryption gets recognition – DEFCON, BlackHat, and ACM CCS
A team of great people from the Security Group at UCL and our start-up Enigma Bridge designed and implemented a practical security system tolerant to severe attacks compromising all parts of the supply chain. We will present and demonstrate it at DEFCON in Las Vegas.
I have mentioned this multi-party encryption project of ours (Enigma Bridge) and University College London here earlier. If you’re planning to go to BlackHat US or DEFCON-25, come and see our talks about practical “ultra-secure” multi-party encryption for the cloud and some of the technology enabling it (Unchaining the JavaCard Ecosystem).
We have been working with University College London (UCL) for a while and one of the results is an easy to use implementation of cryptographic functions for JavaCards. We will be briefing on this at Black Hat 2017 USA.