KeyChest HTTPS monitoring started small – to help us manage our certificates and its free service grew with interest. It’s the right approach from the business point of view, but it has its dark side. A major incident flashed it out last Saturday.
If you want to see raised eyebrows, just say “unbreakable crypto”. Yet everyone assumes their use of crypto is “unbreakable”. Security experts know it’s safe to reject “unbreakable systems” out of hand, but they often rely on the unbreakability of security protocols day in, day out.
I wrote about the ROCA vulnerability yesterday. It affects Infineon security chips used in TPMs and smart cards. While it is easy to identify TPM modules and computers using them, smart cards are more difficult.
Looking back, we can find many examples of errors in the algorithms used to create encryption keys. Not very many of them, however, were found in chips designed and sold as high-security devices for email signing, verifying software integrity, VPN access, or citizen e-ID cards.
We have had a busy Summer so far. We introduced a new service for SSL certificate monitoring (keychest.net), presented at Black Hat USA, and gave a talk at DEFCON. The latest news was recognition of our cryptographic platform by reviewers of the ACM CCS conference. Continue reading Enigma Bridge encryption gets recognition – DEFCON, BlackHat, and ACM CCS
We have compiled all practical information we could find and written it up at Numbers you need to know. It’s a long list of restrictions, rate limits, and other useful information to keep in mind. Here’s a few selected points that we found interesting. Big thanks to schoen from Certbot/EFF for pointing out numerous inaccuracies.
A team of great people from the Security Group at UCL and our start-up Enigma Bridge designed and implemented a practical security system tolerant to severe attacks compromising all parts of the supply chain. We will present and demonstrate it at DEFCON in Las Vegas.
Is it really possible to design an encryption system, which is as strong as its strongest link? There is never a straight “yes” answer to this question, but we are now as close as one can get.
We have all heard about hackers stealing huge user databases with passwords as they are tempting bounties. FT, Guardian and many others create a new kind of reward – their internet encryption keys via CDNs – services speeding up web traffic.
We have started testing our SSL certificate spot checks – KeyChest – and realized that we were conceptually different from SSL Labs. We focus on the server rather than the domain name and it makes a difference.