We have all heard about hackers stealing huge user databases with passwords as they are tempting bounties. FT, Guardian and many others create a new kind of reward – their internet encryption keys via CDNs – services speeding up web traffic.
We have started testing our SSL certificate spot checks – KeyChest – and realized that we were conceptually different from SSL Labs. We focus on the server rather than the domain name and it makes a difference.
While implementing features of the certificate planner, we have added a few handy features to the KeyChest spot checker as well. It is now much more than just a tool to check when a website certificate expires.
You may think I’m pulling your leg, when I say that you share encryption keys with an adult content website, road sweepers West Sussex, or hackers trying to impersonate Apple. But that’s exactly what happens when you use a free (CDN) service with HTTPS.
We have been using Letsencrypt certificates for a year now. As it is free, we have been constantly increasing the number of services using it. I personally like the three months validity as it makes renewals a “business as usual” task, rather than incidents. But it doesn’t happen through magic.
I have come across Troy Hunt’s article yesterday about getting an EV certificate. His initial assumption is that EV certificate actually proves something, unlike many other seals of “security”. But is it really worth spending $80+/year?
We introduce an integration plugin for Let’s Encrypt. It provides integration for a variety of mechanisms that enable and simplify verification of domain control and certificate installation. We already tested it with Dehydrated (former letsencrypt.py) . It supports all existing verification methods: DNS, HTTP and TLS-SNI, in their current versions “01”.
We have extended the original research and can now use information from public keys (HTTPS, TLS, SSH, SSL) to audit cyber security management and compliance with internal standards.
The growth of Let’s Encrypt is phenomenal – 7 million certificates in last four months. The remaining hurdle for automation is verification of domain ownership. Well, actually it is NOT true. We were doing syntax testing – hoping to get the right kind of verification error … only to discover we have been successfully verified without providing any information.
This post is about a research done by one of our co-founders. Petr showed that it is possible to find which tool or hardware device generated RSA keys from just a few public keys. I’m thinking it’s an attack, unexpected data leakage channel, but also an excellent source for audit-related analytics.